This article will attempt to examine the ideas behind the ontological argument in an effort to see whether the argument has any merit, whether as an argument in and of itself, or as an aid to other arguments. It will be shown that the ontological argument suffers from various problems, but can be used in conjunction with the cosmological argument.
Footnote or Endnote:
Kendal Rasnake, "Toward a Useful Ontological Argument," RampartProductions.org, Rampart Productions, May 11, 2025, https://www.rampartproductions.org/articles/toward-a-useful-ontological-argument.
Bibliography:
Rasnake, Kendal. "Toward a Useful Ontological Argument." RampartProductions.org. Rampart Productions, May 11, 2025. https://www.rampartproductions.org/articles/toward-a-useful-ontological-argument.
This paper will attempt to examine the ideas behind the ontological argument in an effort to see whether the argument has any merit, whether as an argument in and of itself, or as an aid to other arguments. In so doing, it is hoped that the ontological argument might prove useful in Christian apologetics, but only in a way that is truly merited by its ideas, logic, and realistic capability.
Even to say that one will examine the ontological argument begs the question, “Which one?” After the original argumentation by Anselm, the ideas have been reformulated again and again. It would also be fair to note that Anselm may not have originally intended for the “Ontological Argument” (OA) to be pulled out of his individual chapters of the Proslogion as they have been. After all, what author desires that an individual chapter of his book be pulled out and examined outside of the context of the rest of his book? “Whether the argument really occurs in the Proslogion is another question. But even if this ‘second OA’ is the discovery of Anselm’s interpreters rather than of Anselm, it is Anselmian in that it rests on the definition or conception of God as the greatest conceivable being (GCB), and it is an OA in that it begins entirely with putative a priori truths and ends with a positive existential conclusion, namely, that God exists.” [1] It is this move from thought, or a priori truths, to a positive existential conclusion that will be examined.
The methodology will begin by 1) stating the ontological argument and examining the basic ideas, 2) examining what works and what doesn’t work within the concepts of the ontological argument, and 3) attempting to realistically determine if and how the ideas within the ontological argument may be used for Christian apologetics.
For Anselm, while man does have existence, God represents the ultimate transcendent existence that can be conceived. Since it would be better to necessarily exist than only possibly exist, God must necessarily exist since He represents the ultimate transcendent existence. To ignore that ultimate existence is foolish.
A more modern version may help illustrate the various concepts to be examined.
Certain concepts located within, or suggested by, this argument put forth by Charles Hartshorne that may prove useful to consider include:
The attempt will now be made to “walk through” and “test” these concepts and premises. In the end, it may be seen how solidly the ontological argument is, or is not, holding up.
How do we know we exist? Because we are present enough to ask the question. This comes under the heading of the undeniability test for truth.
But the ontological argument deals with the idea of knowing the existence of someone else. “The point of an ontological argument is to enable non-empirical knowledge of its conclusion, namely, that God exists.” [3] While existence of ourselves can be known, the question of the existence of a Being we would call God is the question at hand.
John Turri argues that the ontological argument is “doomed to fail” based on three premises. The first premise states that you cannot non-empirically know that another specific person exists now. The second premise states that if the ontological argument would succeed, we would non-empirically know that God exists. The third premise is that we are not God.
From those three premises it follows that no ontological argument can succeed for you. For if any ontological argument can succeed for you, then you can non-empirically know that God, a person, exists now. But you are the only person whom you can non-empirically know to exist now. So either you are God, or no ontological argument can succeed for you. But you are not God. So no ontological argument can succeed for you. [4]
With this argument in place, the ontological argument would seem to be limited to only using our innate knowledge. That which can be observed or experienced would be ruled out, including individual experiences of transcendental feelings of something divine, experiences with what is perfect or not, and experiences with what is finite or not. If we cannot innately know of another’s existence, then the ontological argument will fail.
Paolo Valore dealt with the idea of the existence of God through innate knowledge. The argument basically states that since we have an idea of God it must be innate, and since the idea of God is innate within us, God must be its cause, therefore God exists. “The main problem is that, in this form, the argument is patently circular. Our innate idea of God can guarantee God’s existence only it is truthful; but it can be truthful because God doesn’t lie. But if God didn’t exist, we’d lose such a guarantee. The only conclusion we can draw is then that the existence of God can be proven, in this way, only by assuming it as a premise.” [5] It therefore follows that the innate knowledge option also fails.
In part 2.a of Hartshorne’s argument we read, “There is nothing contradictory in the concept of a being that cannot not be.” [6] Of course Hartshorne is referring to a necessary being, i.e. – God, but it may need to first be established that we can see the two different ideas of being and necessity. In other words, the idea of being does not automatically carry with it the idea of necessity, nor does necessity always refer to a being. To evoke one does not evoke the other. This may seem obvious, but it is pointed out as a stepping stone to the next two concepts.
The differentiation between being and necessity is also posited as a point in which the ontological argument will fail. “Van Inwagen maintains, not only that we don’t, in fact, know whether the property of necessary existence is compatible with the property of being a concrete entity, but that we cannot know whether they are compatible. If we cannot know whether the existence of God, as traditionally conceived, is thus even possible, then, it seems, any ontological argument will fail.” [7] This may be especially true if we accept the definition of ontological as dealing with purely innate knowledge.
After stating the plausibility for a being that cannot not be in 2.a, Hartshorne continues by defining the “necessary being” in 3. In essence, he states that if a being is a necessary being, then it must be rather than simply existing as a possibility. He is not yet stating that a necessary being exists, only defining it.
Part of the definition for a “necessary being” by Hartshorne included the negative defining characteristic of not “merely possible.” After the definition, Hartshorne then begins to give his argument for the existence of God based on the idea that God is a non-contingent being (3.a). “God by definition is an independent Existence and, hence, cannot be produced by another as ‘merely possible’ beings can be.” [8] In other words, since God relies upon no one else for existence, He is a non-contingent being.
One potential problem is that this part of the argument is where Hartshorne is attempting to show that God meets the definition of a “necessary being” (3). However, how is the defining of God as non-contingent move us from the hypothetical into reality? It may be that Hartshorne is falling victim to the Fallacy of Equivocation, which means he is defining something one way in one place and defining it another way in another place. Hartshorne defines that a “necessary being” would not be “merely possible” and to this we would agree due to the inclusion of the characteristic of necessity. A “necessary being” contradicts the idea of a “merely possible” being and thus the Law of Noncontradiction would eliminate at least one of the ideas. However, now Hartshorne defines the idea of non-contingency (3.a) as also not being “merely possible.” The first use of the definition seems to define something that “must exist,” and the second definition seems to define “something that does not require others for its existence.” Robert Ross dealt with a similar problem in addressing the work of Paul Tillich. “While it is not entirely clear just what transition Tillich thinks cannot be made, it seems reasonable enough to assume that the remark is meant as aversion of a certain line of criticism that runs: one cannot argue from conceptual being to being in reality. That is, from an investigation of certain features intrinsic to a given concept one cannot determine whether that concept has any instances.” [9] Hartshorne, in his second definition (3.a) seems to give the idea that God is non-contingent and then use that as reason for His existence. But this seems to be doing what Ross decries in that it is noticing the certain feature of a concept and then unjustly moving to the idea that the concept has existence.
Hartshorne then moves to defining God as “everlasting” or “eternal” (3.b). Once again, however, defining an attribute of a concept does not move that concept into reality, as seen in the previous section.
A similar example might be seen in the existence of the universe. Three possibilities are posited for the existence of the universe: 1) the universe is eternal, 2) the universe created itself out of nothing, or 3) something or someone caused the universe to begin. Hartshorne’s two attributes of God are 1) non-contingent and 2) eternal. Yet these two attributes describe the first possibility for the existence of the universe, the idea that the universe is eternal. If it is eternal, then it by definition meets the second attribute of God defined by Hartshorne. By being eternal we realize that it always would have been and relies on no one for its existence, and is thus non-contingent. The problem, however, is that an eternal universe does not exist, even though the concept matches the substantiating “definition” of the necessary being as given by Hartshorne (3.a, 3.b). If an eternal universe does not exist, then it does not necessarily exist.
Since the definitions given by Hartshorne of “non-contingent” (3.a) and “eternal” (3.b) may help to define God but do not move us from concept to Being, we must conclude that the existence of God is in the conclusion (4). However, what we have in the conclusion (4) is a definition of a “necessary being.” The jump is attempted to be made from a “non-contingent (3.a) and “eternal” (3.b) being to a “necessary being” (4). However, as with the universe, we have already seen that something that is “non-contingent” (3.a) and “eternal” (3.b) does not necessarily exist. At least, it does exist conceptually, but not necessarily in reality. The definition of a “necessary being” (4) in concept does not automatically lead to the existence of a “necessary being” (4), especially when the argumentation for the “necessary being” consists of definitions of attributes (3.a, 3.b) which would fit a “necessary being,” if and only if that “necessary being” actually existed.
So far, the problems within the ontological argument might be summarized as:
In order to overcome the problems associated with the ontological argument we must look to empirical and revelatory information. The next section will present a thought on empirical knowledge and the section following on revelatory knowledge.
The empirical knowledge that is needed for the ontological argument can be found within thec osmological argument, or what may be referred to as the “kalām” argument, for the existence of God. The argument goes:
The cosmological argument may even be said to be a hidden part of the ontological argument. “Many current philosophers feel that the ontological argument fails because it has a hidden cosmological premise, i.e., that something exists.” [11] In essence, the cosmological argument points us to the “necessary being” that is necessary to explain the universe coming into being. By examining the universe and determining that it has a beginning, we realize that the universe is contingent and finite. Therefore, based on the cosmological argument, we look for the independent (3.a) and eternal (3.b) necessary being that necessarily exists, not ontologically but rather cosmologically. Therefore, we might say the ontological argument contains a cosmological hinge. The ontological argument moves with and is attached to the cosmological argument. “The reference to cosmological arguments in turn seems inevitable in order to justify the conceivability of such a god, which is a required premise of the ontological argument. Thus such an ontological argument assumes what it ought to demonstrate, namely the necessary existence of god.” [12]
Using the Bible, the revelation of God, to determine His existence, would not fulfill the ontological argument within its non-empirical confines, but that goal has been abandoned. It is, however, logical to use the revelation of God to find out about Him, for 1) God would be the best source about Himself, and 2) based on the cosmological argument we are already on the “hunt” for the necessary being and any evidence to aid us in that hunt should be fair game.
God describes how we should know that there is a “necessary being” and defines Himself as that “necessary being.” “Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:” [13] Here God tells man that His eternal nature and eternal power can be seen by the world that surrounds man. Man can use logic and science to determine that the universe is contingent and finite. Man is without excuse when it comes to looking for the eternal existence that could have brought the universe into being. But God also defines Himself as an existence that causes things to be. “And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.” [14] God gives His name as “YHWH.” Anne Marie Kitz talks about the two meanings that go with this name.
The qal perfective *yahwī emphasizes two major features. (1) Existence is divinity’s essential nature, according to which it is both defined and distinguished. (2) The intransitive character of the stative root allows the qal to indicate the physical state of the subject, while the perfective aspect articulates the notion that divinity manifests itself through completed events in time that involve nothing more than divine presence…Rather than highlighting the person of divinity, as does the qal, the hiphil focuses on divine doings. [15]
Put simply, the qal form expresses 1) being, and the hiphil focuses on the 2) causative action which is the activity of God. Put them together and the name means “the one (1-the existence) who causes things to be (2-activity).” This is the exact being we are looking for from the cosmological argument, the “necessary being” that must exist eternally in order to cause the universe to be. “Dombrowski himself hints cursorily to the cosmological argument as another of the components of the more global argument to get the ontological argument moving. The conceivability of god, therefore, would translate into the possibility of god as secured by cosmological arguments.” [16]
The cosmological argument overcomes the problem of defining by showing more empirically that a necessary being must exist, rather than by the definition alone. The revelation of God overcomes the epistemological, innate, and necessary problems as God has revealed Himself to actually exist and any innate knowledge that may have pointed to God’s actual existence is verified as correct.
Since we have abandoned the non-empirical ontological argument and moved to an argument hinged on cosmology and based in empirical and revelatory data, perhaps we should call the argument the “onto-logic” argument as written about by Kuntz.
But biblical language, with an unanalyzed way of talking does designate such a necessary existence. Now if biblical Hebrew translatable into English can do it, so can a language devised by Anselm or some other metaphysician. We need merely state what the characteristics of this language are to see the conditions of a valid form of the ontological argument. I believe that the conditions are partly extra-logical, that is, they involve relations of the language to what is experienced and talked about. Hence it is better to call it an "onto-logic." This is no objection to it, for any logic is devised to deal with some structure or other and generally commits us to the reality of such a structure. [17]
The structure of logic may be employed to incorporate the cosmological argument and the ontological argument together, thus giving us an “onto-logic” argument that does not work alone, but in conjunction with its cosmological hinge. A simple argument might appear as:
We leave further research to the claim of God to another paper. Suffice it to say that the being of God as revealed in the Bible matches the “necessary being” for which we would be looking based on the cosmological and onto-logic argument. A statement from Kuntz goes along with this idea of examining the universe first (cosmological) and then following up with a “necessary being”(onto-logic). “So I think the necessary being of God referred to in a valid ontological argument is the being necessary to there being the universe there is.” [18]
The ontological argument, in any form, may suffer from one or more of the four problems that have been labeled as 1) epistemological, 2) innate, 3)necessary, and 4) defining. The idea that one can know a Being exists because of innate knowledge, and without empirical observation or experience, and without revelatory information, seems beyond one’s grasp.
This conclusion, however disappointing, should perhaps not surprise one as much if one keeps two things in mind. First, if God had appointed innate knowledge of Him in us that we could know Him with certainty within the restrictions of the ontological argument, then would the ontological argument even be necessary? Second, we should not be ashamed of using a posteriori truths in conjunction with the onto-logic argument, as God has revealed Himself through nature and through inspired revelation. In fact, it seems that if this is how God has decided to reveal Himself to man, then that is what man should use. The natural revelation seems apparent from Romans 1:19-20, the fact that Genesis1:1 starts with an assumption of the existence of God, and Paul’s argument in Acts 14:15-17 which states that nature is a witness for God. The special revelation is described as a declaration of God in John 1:18. Anselm may have been trying to use revelation as an underpinning to his “ontological arguments.” “Although Anselm admittedly draws the conclusion that God supremely exists from the very definition of God as the Supreme Being, it is clear from what has been said thus far that he does not thereby provide an a priori proof, which gives full recourse to the knowledge that God exists, independently of revelation.” [19] In fact, Anselm’s arguments are described as “hanging” on revelation. “Anselm's argument hangs on the revelation of God's supremacy through Christ, who is the Image of God inasmuch as He eternally expresses the Spirit that acknowledges the supremacy of the Father, and who is therefore the supreme model of what it means to cognize in the light of God's supremacy.” [20]
Ignoring empirical and revelatory data for purely innate knowledge might have been an interesting goal for the various framers of the ontological argument. However, it seems more apparent that God has given us natural and special revelation by which we will be held accountable for not knowing, or for knowing and playing the “fool.”
In sum, the use of an “ontological argument” might be abandoned for the use of an “onto-logic” argument that coincides with and hinges upon the cosmological argument. In that sense, the “onto-logic” argument may work similarly to the anthropological argument for the existence of God. In that argument, the acceptance of moral law requires the existence of the “necessary lawgiver.” However, the argument works if, and only if, there is acceptance of moral law. Similarly, the “onto-logic” argument shows us that a “necessary being” must have existed in order to cause the universe. However, the existence of this “necessary being” is predicated on the acceptance of the cosmological argument.
[1] Bashar Alhoch, “Stephen Davis’s objection to the second ontological argument,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 no 1 (Aug 2016): 3-4.
[2] Norman L. Geisler, Philosophy of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1974), 151-156, as printed in Dr. Terry L. Miethe and Dr. Gary R. Habermas, Why Believe? God Exists! (Joplin, MO: College Press Publishing Company, 1993), 70-71.
[3] John Turri, “Doomed to fail: The sad epistemological fate of ontological arguments,” in Ontological Proofs Today, ed. Miroslaw Szatkowski (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Books, 2012), 413.
[4] Ibid., 418.
[5] Paolo Valore, Fundamentals of Ontological Commitment (Berlin: De Gruyter, Inc., 2016), 162.
[6] Geisler, Philosophy of Religion, 151-156, as printed in Miethe and Habermas, Why Believe? God Exists!, 70.
[7] Gareth B. Matthews, “The Ontological Argument,” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, ed. William E. Mann (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 100.
[8] Robert R. N. Ross, “A Form of Ontological Argument,” Harvard Theological Review 70 no 1-2 (Jan-Apr 1977): 126.
[9] Geisler, Philosophy of Religion, 151-156, as printed in Miethe and Habermas, Why Believe? God Exists!, 71.
[10] Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics: Hundreds of Answers to Crucial Questions (Westmont, IL: IVP Academic, 1994), 58.
[11] Dr. Terry L. Miethe and Dr. Gary R. Habermas, Why Believe? God Exists! (Joplin, MO: College Press Publishing Company, 1993), 70.
[12] Yiftach J.H. Fehige, “Thought Experimenting with God: Revisiting the Ontological Argument,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 51 no 3 (2009): 262.
[13] The Holy Bible: King James Version, Electronic Edition of the 1900 Authorized Version. (Bellingham, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc., 2009), Ro 1:19–20.
[14] Ibid., Ex 3:13–14.
[15] Anne Marie Kitz, “The Verb yahway,” Journal of Biblical Literature 138 no 1 (2019): 62.
[16] Fehige, “Thought Experimenting with God: Revisiting the Ontological Argument,” 262.
[17] Paul Grimley Kuntz, “The Ontological Argument and ‘God is Dead’”,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 38 no 1 (Mar 1970): 66.
[18] Ibid., 67.
[19] Lydia Schumacher, “The Lost Legacy of Anselm’s Argument: Re-thinking the Purpose of Proofs for the Existence of God,” Modern Theology 27:1 (January 2011): 96.
[20] Ibid., 96.